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mass culture. And while the discourses of postmodernism have become familiar, Negri's name is not so prominent in discussions of the "society of the spectacle."1 Perhaps this omission is due to the lesser role played in critical studies by Italian theoreticians or perhaps to the militantly, though iconoclastic, Marxist orientation of Negri's writings. At the same time that Negri is largely neglected, another Italian Marxist-Antonio Gramsci-continues to be a prominent figure in discussions of social change, in spite of the resounding critiques of Marxism by "post"-Marxists.
From such writers as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Stuart Hall, Joseph Buttigieg, Anne Showstack Sassoon, Edward W. Said, Partha Chatterjee, and many others, Gramsci's work enjoys considerable attention. His writings on hegemony, on civil society and the state, on national-popular questions, and on the nature of subalternity have invited reconsiderations of, and elaborations on, his writings. One of the major attempts on the part of these critics is to bring Gramsci's insights to bear on contemporary culture and politics. Though Gramsci's writings in his pre-prison articles and in the Prison Notebooks are situated in the development of what he himself described as Americanism and Fordism, his comments on culture and politics are transposable to many contemporary issues, especially those involving post-Fordism and postmodernism.
This essay seeks to develop connections between the writings of, and on, Gramsci and the more recent work of Toni Negri. The aim of this essay is not to produce an academic study of influences. My comparison of the two men's writings is animated by two major considerations: to rethink the nature of Gramsci's writings for ways they anticipate and contribute to current debates concerning the political nature of modernism and postmodernism; and, specifically, to situate this discussion in relation to Negri, whose work helps to validate Gramsci's revolutionary position and to provide an antidote to predominantly reformist readings of Gramsci.
These two theoreticians can be compared for their critical concern with Marxism and revolutionary struggle. The most obvious further connection is the fact that both men have been prisoners of the Italian state and both have much to say on the nature of the modern state and its repressive functions, functions that are intimately tied to the nature of modern capital and its protean forms. If Gramsci's writings are animated by the
The Nature of Political Struggle
The development and institutionalization of fascism constitutes a major impetus for Gramsci's work. His imprisonment only crystallized the nature of the struggles that he sought to combat in his work with, and in his conception of, the nature of the party. He was as suspicious of spontaneism as he was of vanguardism, seeing them both as short-term, if not counterproductive, modes of action. Later, in his notes written from prison, he would examine the failures of colleagues to understand modern capitalism and study the weapons necessary to bring about communism. While his notes are shrouded in the requisite language to pass approval of prison authorities, it is still possible to see, in his notes on Italian history, the "Modern Prince," civil society and the state, and especially Americanism and Fordism, that the mode of analysis required is an orchestrated philosophical, political, historical, economic, and cultural treatment, a situation that prevails in the writings of Negri. For example, one of the characteristics of fascism acknowledged by Walter Benjamin, and more recently by Negri, is its elimination of politics from cultural considerations. For Gramsci, Negri, and Benjamin, culture does not exist in isolation from questions of domination; nor does it exist apart from the various social groups involved in the existing hegemony or in opposing it:
The methodological criterion on which our own study must be based is the following: that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as "domination" and as "intellectual and moral leadership." A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate," or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and, indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to "lead" as well. (SPN, 57; Q, 3: 2011-12) Uppermost for Gramsci is the question of gaining and holding power. For him, power is not merely a matter of moral consensus but also of force. As domination, the gaining of power requires control of social/state apparatuses. In Gramsci, as in Foucault, power is not unidirectional from apex to base but is disseminated throughout the society. Moreover, subaltern groups who seek to transform power relations must recognize and overcome antagonisms among themselves. In many recent writings on Gramsci's politics, what is often slighted is the emphasis he places on the conception of the political and cultural as inextricable from economic considerations, and on the impossibility of severing political from cultural concerns. Thus, the study of what Gramsci termed hegemony and his exploration of the possibilities for counter-hegemony are characterized by a multifactorial type of analysis.
Though Negri seems to devote more time than Gramsci does on the perpetual crises generated by capital as exemplified in passages from Capital and the Grundrisse, Gramsci's work is in no way hostile to such an analysis. Ostensible difference in emphasis may be due to Gramsci's pre-prison preoccupation with active organization and struggle and to later constraining prison conditions that necessitated circumscription. However, it can be seen that Gramsci's notes involving work and workers constantly stress the interrelatedness of production and politics. His war on Marxist economism was waged in the face of attempts to reduce social and political problems to the realm of money and wages. He is unambiguous in his quotation from Marx's Critique of Political Economy that "it is on the level of ideologies that men become conscious of conflicts in the world of economy" (SPN, 162; Q, 2: 1592).
Since, for Gramsci, the essential element in political transformation is the reappropriation of the state and civil society by workers, politics is inextricable from questions of production. A major distinction between Gramsci's and Negri's positions in relation to questions of subjectivity, knowledge, and power, attributable to their historical situations, resides in their analyses of the nature of existing productive forces and the historical antagonisms they generate. In Negri's terms, the potential for the recognition of the autonomy of the political is dependent on the complete restructuring of social relationships produced in late capitalism as exemplified in post-1968 years. The concept of a socialized worker is his attempt to identify the contemporary nature of work with new forms of knowledge. Socialized work is the result of a "very impetuous historical process which has pushed the dialectic between autonomy and institutions to the point of an explosion-to the point of an irreversible break."3 Traditional notions of politics have undergone radical transformation. In ways only sketched by Gramsci, Negri acknowledges that social life has become pervasively political through the antagonisms generated by new social/economic conditions relating to the new and global conditions of communications.
For Negri, the autonomy of the political is not something that is willed into existence. The self-recognition of the subject is the consequence of conditions that are constitutive, created out of the particular conditions of economic development. Furthermore, the constitution of subjectivity and struggle depends on militancy and organization, but new forms of militancy and organization severed from traditional corporative institutions. He stresses, too, in terms evocative of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's comments on the work of the Subaltern Studies Group, that "sometimes, indeed, when one lives through phases of overt struggle, the memory may be one of defeat and of the thousand-and-one underhand or mistaken methods which the clandestine struggle involved" (PS, 148-49). Negri's awareness that defeat may become the basis for new antagonisms seems to echo Gramsci's critical analysis of political struggle.' For both thinkers, the notion of clandestinity-transgression and subversion-is central to the undermining of the social in its present forms toward the ends of reincorporating the political into the social.
In Gramsci's terms, we move from the war of siege to the war of maneuver. The conditions of possibility for revolution are uppermost in Negri. In terms that are suited to his political purposes, he invokes the notion of utopia and dystopia, deriving his ideas from Spinoza: Utopia is thus accompanied by the certainty that reality is oppressive though under control. Let us call this situation "dystopia." This means that we have reached the threshold of victory and that the causes which inspire us are irresistible. It also means, however, that victory will require the employment of new and terrible forms of violence; that it will require the direct organization of the social, the reappropriation of production, and the establishment of a new social and productive order. (PS, 152) While both Gramsci and Negri are in general agreement on these ends, there is a half century separating their analyses that concern the state in relation to civil society and the importance of the party as an instrument for change.
The State and Civil Society
Gramsci's discussions of the state and civil society are among the most innovative aspects of his thought. In his examination of Italian history, for example, and the conditions leading to the rise of fascism, the role of the state comes to assume a major role. According to him, the state and civil society are not antithetical but variable according to given historical circumstances. Furthermore, the issue of power is closely tied to the conditions of civil society and to the encroachments of the state. In his discussion of passive revolution, which constitutes the restoration of the ruling groups at a time of crisis, the state plays a formidable role in relation to civil society. According to Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Gramsci seems to put forward different conceptions of these relations between civil society and the state. In some instances, he seems to suggest that they are in conflict with each other; in others, he seems to see them as reciprocal; and in still others, he seems to see civil society subsumed by the state. Since his writings on this subject are located in different contexts, it seems reasonable to assume that Gramsci sees them as not stable but as depending on specific political, economic, and social conditions. In his analyses of fascism, he sees the state assimilating civil society. Fascism relied on the apparatuses of civil society-churches, unions, schools, leisure organizations, and economic activities.
In his discussions of Italian history, Gramsci indicates that the distinction between civil society and the state is "a methodological one." The "bourgeois class," Gramsci says, "poses itself as an organism in continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its own cultural and economic level. The entire function of the State has been transformed; the State has become an 'educator,' etc." (SPN, 260; Q, 3: 2302). Along with its coercive apparatuses, the state subsumes civil society, encourages economic-corporative activities, and intervenes in the cultural sphere. In this respect, too, the position of intellectuals cannot be divorced from the role of the state. Beginning with the assumption that the conquest of power is intimately tied to the "assertion of a new productive world," the hegemony of the dominant class can be located in its conjoining economic and political power through state power. Moreover, "since the state is the concrete framework of a productive world and since intellectuals are the social element that identifies itself most closely with governmental personnel, it is characteristic of the function of intellectuals to present the state as an absolute, thus the historical function of the intellectuals is conceived as absolute, and their existence is rationalized .... And whenever intellectuals seem to 'lead,' the concept of the state in itself appears with all the 'reactionary' retinue that usually accompanies it" (Q, 1: 132-33).5 Well aware of the dangers of the absolutist state, and therefore of the need to struggle against "Enlightenment thought," Gramsci's rethinking of civil society focuses on the problematic of the subaltern. In his essay on the "Southern Question," Gramsci decries the notion that the workers will have to tie their fates to that of the state, finding that this position will result merely in their becoming appendages of the "bourgeois state." 6 In relation to questions of state power in bourgeois society, Negri uses Spinoza to challenge natural-right philosophy and especially notions of a social contract usually at the basis of legitimations of the state. Negri explores certain implications of natural rights and social contract conceptions, among which is the "dialectical transfer from the individual to the universal to the absolute," resulting in "the political miracle (and mystification) of the bourgeois ideology of the State."7 Against the notion of a contract and its relation to state power, Negri counterposes the figure of Machiavelli, invoked also by Spinoza, in his charting an alternative conception of collective will and sovereignty. The figure of Machiavelli is also central to Gramsci's political thought. Though often accused or lauded for his Hegelian conception of the state, the ways in which Gramsci's "modern prince" functions as a party would seem to qualify any simplistic ascription of his thinking to "mere" Hegelianism.
Negri projects federalism as a possible model for an alternative to the bourgeois state. He does not reject constitutionalism but seeks to envision an alternative (and stabilizing) notion of conflicting interests within the framework of a classless society. He also sees this form of organization as contributing further to the growth of collectivity as well as concomitantly enhancing revolutionary subjectivity. The objective is ultimately to achieve the devolution of all the functions of the state to the community, but in terms of the hegemony of the proletarian-not bourgeois-collectivity. He posits that the power of the state is tied to the threat of nuclear war in re- based not only on the actual threat of extermination but more particularly on the nuclear threat as a form of control, the fact that "[t]he nuclear state is a state founded on secrecy" (PS, 125). This secrecy destroys any possibility for social cooperation. The nature of expropriation resides in the way state secrecy functions to mystify and, hence, to control. Mystification resides particularly in the appearance of openness and democratic procedures, a major strategy for the perpetuation of government secrecy. Norberto Bobbio has himself expressed great concern about the future of democracy in the face of state secrecy.8 For Negri, however, the future of democracy is intertwined with the fate of capital and particularly with exposing the connections between fixed social capital and the state machinery, seeing expropriation as a genuine productive process.
The important element for Negri is the power of the state expressed in the subsumption of civil society into global capital: "This phenomenon normally manifests itself in the form of the state.... [R]eal subsumption reveals the social dichotomy not simply within civil society, which in any case is impossible to isolate in this situation; rather, it reveals the dichotomy to us within that determinate complex which is constituted by the new composition of civil society and the state" (PS, 171). In these changed relationships, there is no longer the familiar relationship between subject and sovereign but, rather, to return to terms constantly drawn on by Negri, the existence of power and countervailing power. To grasp this is to grasp that the alternatives are now between war or revolution. War is the terrain of the state and revolution of the socialized workers. Thus, it follows that reformism and revolution are not matters of choice but outgrowths of prevailing conditions. Reformism is no longer possible in the face of these new global conditionsthe nature of the nuclear state and the perpetual warfare of the state against workers. Hence, revolution would seem to be an outgrowth of the recognition of the antagonistic relations toward the state, the increased knowledge of contradictions concerning work in the sense in which Negri has redefined it in a post-Fordist context as socialized work, and the creation since the late 1960s of new, and more antagonistic, forms of subjectivity. Yet, his groping for precedents, as well as new formulations, seems generated out of exploring historical precedents that can chart new forms of hegemony, The role of knowledge in cultural change is dependent on the formation of new intellectual groups (not individuals); moreover, these groups speak not for, but with, subalterns. Insofar as the state is legitimated by traditional intellectuals, the role of opposition involves the creation of new intellectual blocs in the interests of weakening the power of the existing ones. Gramsci seems ambiguous, however, on the question of the state and emergent groups. Their role, it would seem, is to make a "conquest of state power"; yet, given his conception of new organizational groups, of the party, it would also seem that he is no longer talking of the absolutist state but rather of a conception of the state as civil society.
Gramsci's conjoining of relations between the conditions of contemporary culture and of workers' struggles can best be seen in his scattered, and highly provocative, comments on Americanism and Fordism. These comments are indicative of his attempt to understand the nature of capitalism in the 1920s and to chart new directions for the state and civil society. Both the nature of work and of workers, as well as their relations to the bosses, need to be understood within the context of what came to be known as Taylorism and its contributions to the social production of knowledge. In this context, Gramsci is at pains to elaborate the notion that there is no such thing as a nonintellectual: "Although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist ....
There is no form of human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded" (SPN, 9; Q, 3: 1550). In his discussions of Fordism, he insists that he is not describing forms of mindless activity but rather is concerned to indicate the ways in which this system of production has introduced new possibilities of knowledge through the work process. Moreover, as he discusses common sense, Gramsci resists relegating this proverbial, cliched, and formulaic mode of describing and acting in the world to the limbo of false consciousness.
In describing his post-Fordist worker, Negri, too, insists on the situation of workers and the conditions of work as social and intellectual in character and as containing the potential for subversion. Negri speaks, of course, from a position in late capitalism that has to contend with global possibilities of capital that Gramsci could only speculate upon. In his readings of Marx (and presumably Gramsci), Negri asserts a profound difference between conditions under late capitalism and earlier forms of capital. He finds that "in Marx's outline of the successive stages of subsumption, the idea of the socialized worker is merely hinted at and described as a possibility; we, on the other hand, experience the actuality of the concept" (PS, 84). The socialized worker is characterized by a different relationship to power and knowledge, no longer dependent on political centralization of state regimes, on control by the clock, and, hence, on the power of the "boss" and pure monetary considerations.
In terms that are familiar to readers of Deleuze and Guattari, Negri writes, "All this, in the perspective of the socialized worker, corresponds to: a time which is diffuse, articulate, and manifold; a body of knowledge which tends to a maximum of diversity because it is localized and territorialized (without thereby becoming parochial and corporatist, however). What this amounts to is that the socialized worker identifies the nature of the antagonism in the universality of his/her own social being and in the indefinite microphysics of his/her powers" (PS, 87). If in Gramsci's time, and especially under the powerful grip of fascism, the possibilities for exploiting antagonisms against the state was a matter of speculation for Gramsci, it is now a reality for Negri.
What has produced this reality in Negri's terms is the nature of new forms of knowledge through the transformed nature of capital. For example, instead of productive labor being confined to the factory, it is now dif- Consonant with his notion of the pervasiveness of the productive process, Negri's reformulation of the theory of value seeks to map-not measurehow the new "social machines" are both productive of value and also capable of making manifest how technology is involved in the expropriation and exploitation of workers, as well as the ways it contains the potential for liberation of the worker.
New Subjectivities
Of Americanism and Fordism, Gramsci notes that it "requires a specific environment, a specific social structure (or at least a determined intention to create it) and a certain type of state. This state is the liberal state, not in the sense of liberalism in trade, but in the more essential sense of free initiative and of economic individualism which, by spontaneous means, through its own political development, succeeds in establishing a regime of monopolies" (Q, 1: 125).9 Hoare and Nowell-Smith comment that "the 9. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 222. revolutionary working-class movement was in a phase of retrenchment and defeat throughout the capitalist world. In the absence of an antagonistic revolutionary force any changes taking place within the mode of production could at most constitute what Gramsci. .. terms a 'passive revolution.' Changes would take place, leading to the suppression of certain contradictions. But new contradictions would appear in their place" (SPN, 278). In this sense, Gramsci's work seems most timely, given the passive revolution exemplified by Thatcherism and Reaganism that has taken place in the last couple of decades. Nonetheless, his notion of passive revolution does not mean that struggle does not exist or that crisis is not apparent. What it means, however, is that struggle needs to take new forms consonant with contemporary conditions. Gramsci's treatment of history is always with an eye to learning from past failures, not to enshrining old methodologies.
In his discussion of Americanism, Gramsci locates the appearance of a new type of worker, which he identifies in complex terms as involving as yet unknown psychic, social, and political elements. Gramsci seems to be suggesting, as he does in his discussions of intellectuals, that the term designates characteristics far beyond professional considerations and also far beyond merely economistic concerns. The notion of modernization, in the sense in which Walter Benjamin identified it (as in the Arcades project and in discussions of Baudelaire) with psychology and physiology, with new responses to time and space, is also present in Gramsci in a more diluted fashion, but is present nonetheless. In discussing the character of men, of the "new woman," of cinema and other forms of mass entertainment, Gramsci is sensitive to technology and its transformative potential. Though he is critical of Taylorism and mechanization, in some instances he suggests the importance of specialized education and certainly of an awareness of technology with its positive aspects and its threats. Like Negri, he is sympathetic to the need for addressing the dynamic and contradictory nature of the movement of capital as a basis for locating the residual and emergent aspects of culture and politics.
Gramsci's notes on the city and its effects on the lives of inhabitants is certainly in keeping with modernist concerns, but he does not, as he indicates in a diatribe against Giovanni Papini, set the city up as the sole criterion of modern life. In a discussion of "supercountry" and "supercity," he is critical of ideologies that set one up over the other. For him, the city is associated with internationalism, the country with nationalism. The valorization of one above the other constitutes trends in Italian politics. Gramsci is concerned to sweep away instances of analysis that are indicative of "the polemic between parasitic conservatism and the innovating tendencies of Italian society" (SPN, 289; Q, 3: 2151). The polemic over city and country encapsulates Italian North/South conflicts and constitutes a problematic in capitalist development, evident still in highly developed industrial countries and the peripheries where the labor force now resides. Hence, to talk of the city, of the metropolis, without taking account of the periphery, Gramsci suggests, is to identify oneself with one or another of the ideologies that constitute modernism in relation to capital as represented by Europe in the 1920s and 1930s.
Characteristic, too, of Americanism and Fordism as Gramsci develops it is the trend toward corporativism. In Europe, he saw the static treatment of the working classes and the peasant populations, which contributed to disease, malnutrition, chronic unemployment, and the preying of one segment of the parasitic population on another. In his description of Americanism, he sees the development of forms of corporativism, new forms of "rationalization," which have produced "the need to elaborate a new type of man suited to the new type of work and productive process" (SPN, 286; Q, 3: 2146). This new type of worker fostered, under Taylorism, "more perfect forms of automation and more perfect technical organization" (SPN, 293; Q, 3: 2156). Along with technological changes have come juridical changes that have altered the socio-economic structure (SPN, 293; Q, 3: 2157-58). In analyzing the changes taking place, Gramsci is describing new mentalities that introduce questions of sexuality, reproduction, ethics, and cultural representations, including the cinema (SPN, 306; Q, 3: 2169). He is not valorizing modernization, Fordism, or corporativism but, like Negri, in his discussion of socialized work, identifying a trajectory of changes that modernization brings. Both Gramsci and Negri focus on the importance of these changes for massive social and political restructuring.
Gramsci identifies forms of intellectualism in labor. For example, in describing the difference between the printers, compositors, and scribes, he does not become nostalgic about the scribe's loss of artisanship. He points to the fact that not only were many errors perpetuated by these workers but their involvement with the work led them to revise, interpolate, and introduce elements that led to the "remaking" of the text. By contrast, he finds that the compositor "has to be much quicker; he has to keep his hands and eyes constantly in movement, and this makes his mechanization easier" (SPN, 309; Q, 3: 2170). Rather than argue that this latter kind of work is conducive to spiritual death, Gramsci sees it as potentially liberating. In a manner that runs contrary to much of Russian formalism, he suggests that automation permits another form of thought dissociated from the specific task undertaken: "What really happens is that the brain of the worker, far from being mummified, reaches a state of complete freedom" (SPN, 309; Q, 3:2171). He does not make the economism of the worker the sole measure for understanding modern capitalism but rather underscores the importance of economic factors for assessing the degree of knowledge available to individuals.
One of the social arguments Gramsci introduces to develop his description of Fordism entails the question of workers' resistance, which arises from the educative and economic dimensions of Fordism. Other conditions characteristic of the limits and possibilities for change under Fordism, along with its development of workers skilled in the specialized work processes, its automatization of movement, and its rationalization of work, are its tendencies toward higher wages and competition among workers, its continued encouragement of a reserve army of unemployed, its development of forms of state intervention by means of protectionism, state investment, and new forms of disciplining workers. Moreover, while Gramsci was concerned with questions of the national and the popular, his comments on Americanism and Fordism reveal that he was aware of the international dimensions of modern capital, its overflow beyond the borders of any individual nation. Thus, in his notes on Americanism and Fordism, he locates a key moment in the transition of capitalism as Negri does in his description of the three major transformations in capital in this century.
Gramsci's discussion of sex, psychoanalysis, and Prohibition further addresses the socializing dimensions of Fordism, the instruments available, and the antagonisms generated to meet the threat of that socialization. In discussing sexuality in particular, he indicates how this issue has now come to the forefront as a concomitant of Americanism and Fordism, and is subject to regulation. He describes the way in which sex can be viewed now as "spectacle," as "sport," and ascribes these to "a new sexual ethic suited to the new methods of production and work" (SPN, 296; Q, 3: 2150). In his analysis of the relations between animality and industrialism, Gramsci explores two dimensions of this new problematic. There is a growing libertinism that he identifies with these new forms of work and that takes various forms, especially the brutalization of women. At the same time, he identifies a growing Puritanism on the part of the bosses and of the state, both of which seek to regulate these new forms of behavior. Gramsci's comments on sexuality provide another instance of his multivalent analysis in his conjoining of social, economic, and political questions. Moreover, he does not offer simplistic prescriptions but appears more concerned with identifying the components of the "deterritorialization" of the worker.
Elaborating on the "sexual field," Gramsci asserts that it is the upper classes, those not engaged in "productive work," who observe "libertarian practices." These "enlightened" attitudes are spread by the upper classes to the working classes, who "are no longer subject to coercive pressure from a superior class." Gramsci foresees a crisis developing: "A two-fold situation can then create itself in which there is an inherent conflict between the 'verbal' ideology which recognizes the new necessities and the real 'animal' practice which prevents physical bodies from effectively acquiring the new attitudes" (SPN, 300; Q, 3: 2163). In short, Gramsci sees the relationship between these new forms of work and new attitudes toward the body and sexuality, attitudes that can provoke new forms of coercion. While Gramsci's comments are quite brief and cryptic, and while one may question the basis of his generalizations about sexuality, in the larger picture, it is clear that he understands that sexuality has become a force to be acknowledged and examined in relation to issues of coercion and consent. One can elaborate further on these brief comments on sexuality and on gender in relation to Fordism and Americanism as an invitation to understand the role of the state in relation to regulations on civil society, especially the interrelationship-not disunion-between public and private spheres, the increasing encroachment of modern society on the so-called private sector. In describing the nature of the relationship of the state to civil society, and particularly the state as a policeman (veilleur de nuit), Gramsci writes, "The fact is glossed over that in this form of regime (which anyway has never existed except on paper, as a limiting hypothesis) hegemony over its historical development belongs to private forces, to civil society-which is 'State' too, indeed is the State itself" (SPN, 261) .
Thus, even in his discussion of the state, Gramsci invokes cultural issues-the role of intellectuals, the role of literature, journalism, cinema, and folklore. These are integral to the enterprise of assessing conditions for the production of new social subjects. Similarly, concerning the nature of this new social subject, Negri says, "Let us be clear about this, it is an intellectual subject but also a productive one. This means that the productive side of work is now apparent principally on the intellectual level" (PS, 47). Among other characteristics he attributes to this subject are that it is "central to society . . . ethical . . . rebellious" (PS, 48). Yet, unlike Gramsci, Negri seems to situate these workers at the center rather than at the margins. Rather than seeing them as passive and contained, he sees them as aware of, and potentially responsive to, antagonisms. By contrast, Gramsci, in his prison writings on the nature of passive revolution, finds that workers' conditions under fascism had blunted their rebelliousness, though not their growing awareness of working conditions. His comments on the party, especially in his notes on Machiavelli, represent his continued exploration of alternatives to such failures. Negri, too, advances an alternative conception of party as well as a critique of existing parties.
The Party
The party is the vehicle for change in Gramsci, but, like Negri, he is at pains to distinguish it from other prevailing conceptions of party. Gramsci is aware of conceptions of the party that are totalitarian and inextricably linked to the existing state structure. Careful to demarcate his sense of party from reformist conceptions that he deems corporative and economistic, he regards the party as containing the seeds of a new society, of new cultural and political organization. "Clearly," he says, "it will be necessary to take some account of the social groups of which the party in question is the expression and the most advanced element. The history of a party, in other words, can only be the history of a particular social group. But this group is not isolated; it has friends, kindred groups, opponents, and enemies. The history of any given party can only emerge from the complex portrayal of the totality of society and State (often with international ramifications too)" (SPN, 151; Q, 3: 1630).
As the quotation suggests, Gramsci's notion of the party is conceived in terms of process, of organizing rather than of an organization, and represents a heterogeneous rather than a unified will. Social class is identified not by any absolute markers but, as he frequently indicates, by a notion of history as a process of ongoing constitutiveness on the part of individuals and groups. Moreover, social class is not rigid but is identified by different skills, orientations, and forms of education. The question of singularity and difference seems to be an all-important consideration in his description of the nature of the "modern prince." Most significantly, in relation to the problematic relationship between state and civil society characteristic of the moment of capitalism he is describing, he finds that the political party, for all groups, is precisely the mechanism which carries out in civil society the same function as the State carries out, more synthetically and over a larger scale, in political society. In other words, it is responsible for welding together the organic intellectuals of a given group-the dominant one-and the traditional intellectuals.... This function of a political party should emerge even more clearly from a concrete historical analysis of how both organic and traditional intellectuals have developed in the context of different national histories and in that of the development of the various major social groups within each nation, particularly those groups whose economic activity has been more largely instrumental. (SPN, 15-16 In her discussion of the connections between the party and the state, Anne Showstack Sassoon clarifies Gramsci's notion of the party in relation to the state: "That State and that party which claims moral, ethical leadership in the absence of a pluralism of political and cultural forces, remains on the terrain of coercion and economic corporativism."10 In opposition to "coercion and corporativism," Gramsci offers "the expansion of civil society and the absorption by civil society of the political realm, in which State and society become reunited.T"" Gramsci's concern with the formation of the party is linked to the notion of conjuncture, strategic and organic, since these involve the assessment of possibilities for revolutionary struggle. Above all, his mistrust of spontaneism and improvisation leads him to make a link between the role of the condottiere and spontaneism, to forms of action that lead to restoration and reorganization. In effect, he offers yet another perspective on the coming into existence of passive revolution and on the creation of "new national and social structures" (SPN, 129; Q, 3: 1558). In terms of collective action, there is no such thing as pure spontaneity, he argues (SPN, 196; Q, 1: 329), though he does see aspects of spontaneity as conducive to long-range change. As with his notions of common sense, his comments on spontaneity also derive from his concern with subaltern groups, and they are neither monolithic nor rigidly binary. He finds that "every 'spontaneous' movement contains rudimentary elements of conscious leadership, of discipline" (SPN, 197; Q, 1: 329).
Gramsci was explicit in his advocacy of a collective rather than individual notion of leadership. Hence, in his notes, as in his earlier writings, the idea of a "party" was crucial. The party is the "modern prince," and not the condottiere. In his discussions of the party, he indicates that the "modern prince" is not a single individual, not a "real person," but "can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which a collective will, which has already been recognized and has to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to take concrete form" (SPN, 129; Q, 3: 1558). The prince, then, is not a charismatic leader but is the party itself and, as Anne Showstack Sassoon has indicated, is an integral element in Gramsci's thought. Issues of hegemony, conceptions of state and civil society, notions of strategic and organic conjuncture, are inextricable from his notion of the "collective will"-the party. Moreover, the emphasis is not on uniformity of character but of will.
In describing the nature of subaltern groups, Gramsci says, The history of subaltern groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic. There undoubtedly does exist a tendency to (at least provisional stages of) unification in the historical activity of these groups, but this tendency is continually interrupted by the activity of the ruling groups; it therefore can only be demonstrated when an historical cycle is completed and this cycle culminates in a success. Subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up: only "permanent" victory breaks this subordination, and that not immediately. In reality, even when they appear triumphant, the subaltern groups are merely anxious to defend themselves.... Every trace of independent initiative on the part of subaltern groups should therefore be of incalculable value for the integral historian. (SPN, 54-55; Q, 1: 299-300)
In analyzing subalternity, Gramsci is careful to consider several crucial elements: (1) subaltern groups are not unified by virtue merely of their subaltern status; (2) whatever unity they achieve is fragile and subject to antagonisms originating from the ruling elements; and (3) their failures are as important to assess as their victories. While he sees the existence of a "sediment" of leadership, and hence the ability to distinguish between organic and strategic conjunctures, spontaneous and planned forms of action, he also recognizes that spontaneous movements are "accompanied by a reactionary movement of the right-wing of the dominant class" (SPN, 199; Q, 1: 331). Such movements exist in part because of the "objective weakening of the State," but "in the modern world, the regressive examples are more frequent" (SPN, 200; Q, 1: 332). Gramsci attaches great importance to the weakening of the state and to the proper strategies required, via the party, for exploiting that weakness rather than producing conditions for restoring it. Furthermore, in his explorations of hegemony, an aspect of Gramsci's thought that has intrigued contemporary cultural critics, Gramsci does not advance simplistic notions of populism, nor, by the same token, do his comments suggest forms of contemporary trasformismo. His notion of alignments is critical and discriminating, and is certainly much more fluid than the ideas of many of his Marxist contemporaries. Negri's conception of the party, too, has negative connections to the bourgeois political party and to Leninist versions of party. For him, as for Gramsci, the party is an alternative, and revolutionary, mode of political organization. The party seems more generally aligned with Gramsci's equation of the party with civil society. Negri asks, What is the role of the party in the light of the new reality constituted by the revolutionary subject? We can immediately say that the party cannot assert itself as a representative: this is not possible given the social composition of the proletariat. Even less can it assert itself as the vanguard of the working class before social labor. The problem which this double negation of the traditional theory of the party raises cannot be solved other than in practice, i.e. through continuous experiences of organization and struggle.
In all probability, the party will be able to be born again only as the organizer of countervailing power. (PS, 184) Negri's is a party that operates against, and not within, the state. Invoking Gramsci's notion of passive revolution-that is, revolution from above in the face of the passivity of the masses-Negri inverts the concept. "Today it is appropriate," he writes, "to use the expression 'passive revolution' to indicate a passive process of sectional movements of the masses which imposes revolution from below" (PS, 186). No longer possible to generate reforms in Keynesian terms as a means toward allowing workers some measure of wealth, the passive revolution should be waged in terms of the temporal well-being of society, but this cannot take place until proletarian power can consolidate itself, and this is where the party as a vehicle for countervailing power can be important. Since the nuclear state operates in imaginary terms to reinforce the pure image of power to contain resistance, no democracy is possible within it. No form of democracy can be asserted until the power of the state is destroyed, and the party, in its heterogeneous, cultural, educative, and "countervailing" role, can be instrumental in this destruction.
Culture and Politics
In Gramsci's writings, so much hinges on the connections he makes between politics and culture. His notions of culture, education, and intellectuals are inextricable from his notion of the party, as we have seen, and his notion of the party is indistinguishable from his conceptions of the state and civil society. His writings on literature, folklore, and, to a lesser extent, cinema are meaningful within the context of his explorations of existing and potential forms of collectivity. His fascination with common sense and folklore constitutes his attempts to map the cultures of subaltern groups. His conception of folklore is not ethnographic. He sees folklore as he sees common sense, as containing sedimentary elements that signal the emergence of new cultural forms and that also provide landmarks for identifying resistances to change. The creation of new forms occurs not ex nihilo but out of the collage of existing forms that are embedded in common sense and in the folklore of a group, which is either denigrated or treated by traditional intellectuals in condescending fashion. While common sense is not "good" sense, it is by the same token not "bad" sense. Moreover, it is intellectual, since there is no such thing as a non-intellectual. Gramsci's notion of common sense, his emphasis on the subaltern's access to knowledge, including his descriptions of the potential for thought and action available to the Fordist worker, anticipates Negri's description of the contemporary socialized worker.
Discussing the productive world of the modern-day worker, Negri the link between knowledge and productive forces is evident in The Savage Anomaly: "Spinoza's mature thought is a metaphysics of productive force that rejects the critical rupture of the market as an arcane and transcendental episode, that instead interprets (immediately) the relationship between appropriative tension and productive force as the fabric of liberation. Materialistic, social, and collective" (SA, 218). The thematics of the Spinoza study are to be understood in the context of Negri's attempt to rethink such concepts as materialism, production, force, crisis, power, and collectivity. The emphasis on the liberation of productive forces, its appropriation by the people, and its antithesis to the capitalist mode of production are derived by Negri from Spinoza's writings. In broad strokes, one finds numerous parallels between Gramsci's insistence on the relationship between the nature of productive forces and the imperative of their appropriation by the party and Negri's comments on the appropriation of power. For example, when Negri states that "appropriation is here a constitutive key, and not the legitimation of a norm of domination" (SA, 221), his comments are not that remote from Gramsci's insistence on the perpetual crisis nature of capitalism and the need to seize on prevailing antagonisms, and especially on the importance of the element of constitutiveness residing in the appropriation of the forms of civil society against the regulating tendencies of the state.
Gramsci's emphasis on the collectivizing potential of language and education, his emphasis on truth rather than legislation, his concern with reason and ethics-all this seems consonant with the concerns that Negri articulates through his discussion of Spinoza's writing. A radical interest in understanding the nature of knowledge and its appropriation, in struggling against notions of the autonomy of the individual subject and of the tyranny of institutions, finds its expression in both Negri and Gramsci. The new subject envisioned by Negri is not the isolated individual but the community. In relation to Spinoza's explorations of power, Negri comments that "thought experiences the affections of being in their individuality and transforms them into ideas-confused ideas but still real ones. This is an expansion of the space of knowledge in comparison to simply true knowledge; it is a basis and a project for a cognitive and operative process in the world of passions; it is the definitive closure of every 'descending path' (from the absolute to the modes) and a hint toward an 'ascending path,' a constitutive path" (SA, 80).
To Negri, the paradox of Spinoza's thought resides in the "ontological identity of things, attributed to the world, revealed by the world, in its singular plurality" (SA, 82). The ethical nature of knowledge, as well as its constitutive character, is at the basis of Spinoza's thinking about power and is crucial to Negri's development of notions of political subversion, rebellion, and freedom:
Politics is the metaphysics of the imagination, the metaphysics of the human constitution of reality, the world. The truth lives in the world of the imagination; it is possible to have adequate ideas which are not exhaustive of reality but open to and constitutive of reality, which are intensively true; consciousness is constitutive; being is not something only found (not only a possession) but also activity, power; there is not only Nature, there is also second nature, nature of the proximate cause, constructed being. These affirmations, which the inter-preters have difficulty squaring with the static image of Spinozism and the immobile figure of cosmic analogy, are instead adequately situated within this new opening in his philosophy. Imaginative activity reaches the level of an ontological statute, certainly not to confirm the truth of prophecy but to consolidate the truth of the world and the positivity, the productivity, the sociability of human action. (SA, 97) This extensive quotation from the work on Spinoza is important, because it corroborates how, through Spinoza, Negri conspires to unsettle the notion of the absolute nature of truth and reason considered requisite to most bourgeois analyses of human behavior and change. In Negri's terms, illusion and imagination are central to the ways in which truth functions. Rather than think in rigid and binary terms about illusion and truth, Negri wants to reinforce the fluid and constitutive nature of perception and constructions of reality. In reconfiguring the role of power in relation to the state in bourgeois society, Negri uses Spinoza to challenge expressions of natural-right philosophy and especially notions of a social contract, both of which are at the basis of the legitimation of the state.
In constructing his politics of subversion, Negri, while sharing certain notions associated with such poststructuralist thinkers as Deleuze and Guattari and Lyotard, seems to be more closely aligned with specifically Marxist and materialist conceptions of social revolution in his mode of understanding "countervailing power." In examining the potential for subversion in contemporary society, Negri elaborates conceptions of subversion remarkably close to the investments in his readings of Spinoza, which he describes as a subversion of all existing structures, or rather, of all those aimed at exploitation either in the first or second instance, directly or indirectly. Subversion is the destruction of violence that is inherent in exploitation and which runs through society, indirectly, massively and terribly: subversion is countervailing power. The more the labor force, as the working subject, becomes intellectual and social, the more the violence inherent in exploitation acquires an intellectual and social character. (PS, 59) The terms that stand out in this particular quotation-power, violence, exploitation, and intellect-are reminiscent not only of his discussion of Spinoza's distinctions concerning power but also of ways in which Gramsci sought to explore the "intellectual and social character" of political, economic, and cultural power.
In his discussion of Marx's conception of the money form, Negri examines, as does Gayatri Spivak in "Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value,"12 the question of money as material representative of wealth. The key is representation. What Negri is compelled to emphasize is that "the money form cannot any longer. . . simply act as a mediation between costs of production and the general value of social labor. It must become a general function of social production, the means of production of the wage relation in an extended, global dimension. The productive role of money leaves its imprint on capital development in the form of a continuous struggle to liberate itself from its functions of mediation in exchange, taking on its true capacity of domination over wage labor, outside and between the petty transactions of the market place." 13 No longer does value constitute the specific nature of labor time as a measure. Yet, in contemporary capitalist society, money still exists in relation to the circulation of commodities, but it has merged with "a new and extremely radical kind of crisis over the capitalist mode of production" (RR, 101). Money represents domination, and in the present conditions, when all forms of production are "socialized," beyond the confines of the factory, money no longer appears as a "rationale" but as a "radical antagonism, a function of pure domination, as a powerful enemy force, which is no longer recuperable to any mere function of mediation" (RR, 101) In Negri's critique of value and description of the new subjectivities at work in contemporary society, he has gone beyond Gramsci in his analysis of the basis and nature of revolutionary change. No longer advocating a war of position but indicating the existence of antagonisms that are generated by both the state and the socialized worker, he sees room to maneuver. The basis for his assessment can be seen in his careful contemporary reading of Marx on value and in his mapping of economic transformations from the interwar era to the present. However, contrary to those readings that elevate Gramsci's comments on the war of position, but taking into account his discussions of the importance of assessing organic and strategic conjunc-ture, short-range and long-range phenomena, Gramsci's concern was with the nature of revolutionary struggle, with communism and not socialism, with radical transformation rather than with reformism.14 Negri's perspective on revolution, however, is more global than Gramsci's; the subsumption of society by capital has taken place now on an international level. Both fascism and imperialism of earlier varieties have been transformed, in ways that Negri describes as "more terrible and widespread," tied to capitalist control but also escaping total control. He writes, "Value has everywhere escaped capitalist control. Or rather, it has overflowed and its presence is fully and widely felt: it circulates among the factories and in the metropolises, and even in the tropical areas hitherto untouched by industrialization" (PS, 105). The politics of world capital are now more uniformly expressed; automation and computerization are the instruments of contemporary global politics. This technology is instrumental in enhancing new forms of power as well as in initiating new forms of social cooperation. While countries captive to neocolonialism have adopted forms of "peripheral Fordism," or, as Negri modifies it, "peripheral Taylorism" which have become Fordism, they, too, "have become full members of the economy of the socialized worker": Just as there coexist within the metropolitan countries two levels of existence-one of integration and a boundary of exclusion-so in the world economy there is the level of internal integration and a boundary of exclusion. Counterposed to the capitalist countries (including the ones that have recently joined this category) and to the world market as an organized structure, there is the world of the excluded-a world of hunger and desperation. In short, the "third world" as such no longer exists, and after the accession of a large part of the latter to the "first world," there followed the discovery of "another world" which lives on the margins and is built on lower, more wretched conditions than those of the first world. (PS, 109) On the basis of these premises, Negri extends the notion of crisis to a global level, indicating some of its manifestations-in international debt, international monetary policies, and new forms of warfare. Negri, however, is not suggesting that the global situation will produce the demise of capitalism automatically. Rather, his argument is designed to chart the ways however, remain at the level of identifying molecular conflicts as the determining factor of social struggle. He asserts that conflicts are also molar: "One passes from microconflicts to molar conflicts," but he does not regard this passage as affecting the "complexity of antagonisms" (PS, 129). In fact, his notion of subjectivity, in its emphasis on plurality as derived from antagonistic alternatives, can coexist with molar or dual conflict. The molar and oppositional elements are not static or idealist. They are dynamically constituted in the face of existing antagonisms, and they do not need to be seen as overriding individual or specific group conflicts. This subjectivity is not free-floating but constituted within specific historical formations, produced by, and productive of, determinate antagonisms. In relation to these specific historical moments, we see that Negri, like Gramsci before him, is seeking a correlation between social subjects as both formed and formative, and, to develop this concern, Negri creates the following historical trajectory. He identifies three phases in the development of modern capital and its relation to the state: 1917-1929, 1929-1968, and 1968 If the term mass worker characterizes productive/political relations until 1968, the term socialized worker becomes most applicable to the economic and political situation prevailing after 1968. It is at this moment that the crisis of the planner state becomes evident and exploitable. The mass worker had set in motion demands relating not only to questions of mobility but to wage expectations, to circulation in relation to both worked and nonworking time, and to subjective conditions concerning social values. Taken together, this situation produced a crisis in relation to capital and its management of labor. The weapons used against these workers after 1968, as we have seen, involve deregulation, unemployment, the creation of poverty, competition for labor on the world market, new forms of technological control, and, literally, state terror. In this schematic view, what we can see is that Negri's mapping is fluid: One phase overlaps another, but the consistent motif is the growing antagonism and the growing social subjection and subjectivity of the workers, the increasing awareness of the futility of reformism, of accommodation, and the increasing violence on the part of the state.
If we adopt Negri's argument about the present crisis nature of capital and the production of antagonistic subjectivities, we can see that he has followed in certain significant ways some of the problems advanced by Gramsci: concerns with corporativism, reformism, and the relevance of information and communication. We can also acknowledge a muted dialogue concerning the nature and appropriateness of passive and active revolutionary struggle. From Negri's vantage point, it would seem that Gramsci's analysis was suited to the particular conjuncture of the 1917-1929 period. Certainly, Gramsci was aware of the restructuration of capital and saw it as both necessary as well as productive of conflict. Gramsci's emphasis on the relations between state and civil society as central to an understanding of the new conditions seems also to be central to the direction of Negri's thought. Moreover, Negri's position in relation to struggle is not one that valorizes spontaneity. He constantly emphasizes the notion of organization, and in that context, he refers to the party. Like Gramsci, for whom the notion of party animated so much of his writing, Negri does not see that circumstances change of their own accord, no matter how antagonistic or how the present celebration of indeterminacy and difference will in itself bring about the new social and productive order. Commenting on the nature of the present crisis in relation to the power of the state, Negri asserts that it is in the interests of the proletariat to create a period of stabilization. This period of stabilization will serve the interests of enhancing "reciprocal regulation between subjects," which entails attempts to "deepen, uncover, and enrich proletarian subjectivity" (PS, 175), to develop consensual areas of concern, and to work for the devolution of state power in the interests of community.
As In discussing Marx's notion of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, Negri identifies two important directions in Marx's formulations. First, the inevitability of crisis deriving from the tendency of profit to fall: Capitalist growth may indeed urge the compression of its quantity, it can indeed multiply the productive force of labor, but after all the surplus value that can be extorted is limited: there is still the rigidity of necessary labor (necessary part of the labor day) to constitute the limit to valorization . .. The sum of necessary labor is rigid and it is precisely on this rigidity that are based the possibilities for a higher valorization on the part of a class, for a self-valorization of the working class and proletariat . .. The law of the tendency to decline represents, therefore, one of the most lucid intuitions of the intensification of the class struggle in the course of capitalist development.15 Thus, one response to the quietism and reformism generated by much of postmodern thinking is this graphic reminder of the inherent tendency of capital to crisis, one form being manifested in the antagonisms produced by this rigidity, which has been, and is, productive of class struggle. The issue is, of course, the nature of the direction of this struggle.
Another response involves Negri's invoking of Marx by way of the Grundrisse on the social character of surplus value. He writes that "the more labor is objectified into capital... all the more living labor opposes this growth in an antagonistic fashion" (MBM, 90). Again, we can see that we are not confronting a passive response to the absorption of labor into capital, the subsumption of civil society into the state, but rather confronting inherent antagonisms. It does not follow, however, that antagonisms will necessarily produce revolution. This is not a situation that is automatically productive of revolution, but it does provide the basis for an alternative to capital's increasingly totalizing and coercive power.
In discussing circulation, Negri comments that "the social conditions of production are formed, organized, and dominated by the organization of circulation, by the impulse capital gives to it. Therefore circulation is, above all, the expansion of the potency of capital; and for the same reason, it entails the appropriation of all the social conditions and their placement in valorization" (MBM, 112). In the discussion of circulation, then, Negri advances another powerful argument for the socialization of capital and concomitantly for the nature of class struggle. Here again, the possibilities of subversion are explored. Capital must seek to overcome time and space as barriers. Both totalizing and disunifying, enabling and also limiting, the process of expansion becomes part of a permanent revolution: "The expansive, imperialistic process of capital and its tension toward the constitution of average terms of world exploitation are then simultaneously the result and the premise for the conditions of revolutionary subjectivity" (MBM, 121).
The important qualification in Negri resides in the terms conditions of subjectivity. There is no doubt that Negri is intent on challenging prevailing notions of the inevitability of postmodern despair, simplistic notions of reformism, and of individual agency. His optimism (not pessimism) of the intellect leads him to chart alternatives to dominant attempts to describe and modify existing social relations. Toward that end, his readings of "Marx beyond Marx," his linking these to an examination of the present economic and political moment known as postmodernism, impel him to reformulate the conditions of contemporary culture and society in terms that do not privilege economism. His analysis takes into account the contemporary circulation of cultural capital through the dominance of communication. While he sees as the source of the problem not information technology but the protean forms of capitalism, he does, like Gramsci, locate the creation of new subjectivities. Through his rethinking of the role of intellectuals, his reformulation of the concept of the state in relation to civil society, and especially his dissection of power, it seems that he has indeed read "Marx beyond Marx" and that we can read him as "Gramsci beyond Gramsci."
